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Over the past few decades, profit rates and various other 
measures of market concentration have been on the rise in 
the United States (De Loecker et al, 2020). These patterns 
of the data have attracted much attention recently in both 
academic as well as policy circles for their impact on 
productivity dynamics, the composition of industries and 
ultimately consumer welfare. The evidence points to 
rapidly growing and highly productive firms as the drivers 
of this phenomenon, with these firms leading the increase 
in markups and the decline in the labor share (Autor et al. 
2017 and 2020). However, these trends seem to be less 
pronounced in Europe, and be driven by factors seemingly 
unrelated to the dynamics of superstar companies.
In this article, we exploit rich balance-sheet data from the 
Banco de España to document the behavior of markups 
at the aggregate level in Spain, and perform various 
decompositions to help us identify the main drivers 
behind their evolution over the period 2004-2017. Our 
main finding is that, contrary to the United States, markup 
dynamics were primarily led by small and unproductive 
firms. Particularly in response to the Great Recession of 
2008, these firms were unable to increase their productive 
efficiency when their average costs rose due to a sharp 
increase in the fixed part of their production costs, and 
this translated into higher price markups. This behavioral 
response, related to the composition of the structure of 
costs, seems to indicate that these firms, when faced 
with economic hardship, may have preferred to increase 
their markups in an attempt to survive in their sector even 
if this may have come at the expense of losing some 
market share in the process. 
Measuring price markups (defined as the ratio of a firm’s 
final output price to the marginal cost of producing it) is 
challenging because of at least two reasons. First, marginal 
costs are a theoretical construct, so one needs a proxy for 
them. Second, output price data at the firm level is scarce, 
if not inexistent. For this reason, we rely on recent 
methodological advances in production function 
estimation (e.g. De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012), 
measuring firm-level markups as the ratio of a variable 
input’s elasticity to output on that input’s share of total 
sales. The Banco de España data proves to be an excellent 
resource because not only is it highly representative of the 
Spanish economy (containing a large amount of firms and 
a very high percentage of aggregate value added), but it 
also contains very disaggregated information on the 
structure of costs, allowing us to disentangle variable 
inputs (e.g. materials and labor expenses from workers 
with fixed-term contracts) from fixed inputs (e.g. other 
operating expenses and labor expenses from open-
ended contracts with large firing costs). It is this latter 
aspect which allows us to make the main point of the 
paper: the evolution of firm-level markups in Spain can be 
explained by firms’ efforts to rebalance their cost structure 
between variable and fixed inputs, a behavioral response 
to the cycle, rather than by reasons of a more structural 
nature. Therefore, in the case of Spain, the evolution of 
markups may not reflect aggregate changes in the 
competitive structure of markets, but rather an idiosyncratic 
response of firms to economic conditions. 
The figure above shows the evolution of the sales-
weighted average markup (measured relative to materials) 
over the period 2004-2017. The average markup has been 
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normalized to one in 2004. We observe that markups are 
countercyclical, rising by about 13ppt between 2004 and 
2009, and declining slightly thereafter. The behavior in 
the first part of the sample is roughly common across 
most sectors of activity, albeit markups continued to rise 
in some specific sectors after 2009, most notably in 
Construction, Supplies and Real Estate. 
Most importantly, we find that the behavior of average 
markups is driven by small and unproductive firms. First, 
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most of the increase during the Great Recession is due to 
the firms at the very top of the markup distribution, who 
happen to be firms with relatively low levels of productivity 
and low market shares. Second, the firms that increase their 
markup the most (in relative terms) during this period were 
precisely this group of small and unproductive companies. 
To understand what is behind this phenomenon, we next 
turn to the behavior of different variable and fixed costs over 
this period. In the figure, the black line is the sales-weighted 
share of each input relative to firm turnover (sales), while the 
red line is an unweighted average. By construction, when 
the sales-weighted average is above the unweighted 
average, smaller firms (in terms of sales) have a lower input 
share of sales. As seen in the figure, there exist sizable 
differences in the terms of the cost structure of firms by firm 
size, especially regarding the contribution of materials and 
labor expenses. First, larger firms devote a larger share of 
their sales to paying for material inputs (the variable input 
relative to which our markup estimates are computed). In 
response to the Great Recession, all firms decreased the 
share of their sales that pays for material expenses, but this 
ratio decreased disproportionally more for smaller firms, 
explaining the stronger response in markups for these 
firms. This phenomenon is reversed for inputs with higher 
adjustment costs, such as general costs and labor 
expenses related to permanent workers on open-ended 
contracts with high firing costs. In both cases, the share of 
sales paying for these fixed inputs increased, indicating 
that in response to the adverse economic shock, 
continuing firms shifted their resources away from variable 
costs into fixed ones, perhaps in an attempt to soften the 
adverse effects of the shock on their economic profits and 
their chances at survival. 
To complement this analysis, we conclude on the evolution 
of firm demographics and measures of market concentration 
during this period. We show that, in spite of the 
aforementioned behavioral responses at the firm level, we 
do observe a decline in firm entry (from about 11% to about 
7% only in the period 2007-2009) and a rise in firm exit (from 
about 4% to 8% in the same period), as well as a mild 
increase in the share of industry sales captured by the ten 
largest firms (on average, from 47% in 2008 to 56% in 2017). 
However, we find that most of the evolution of the sales-
weighted markup is explained by changes in the composition 
of industries among surviving firms, as well as by changes in 
the markups of these firms themselves, rather than by the 
extensive margin of entry and exit of firms. 
All in all, our study demonstrates that understanding the 
structure of firm’s balance sheets is key to understand 
the behavior of markups in Spain. Rather than reflecting 
change in market power per se, the rise in markups during 
the Great Recession seems to have been driven by a 
reshuffling of cost expenditures away from variable and into 
fixed inputs. This was particularly the case among small and 
unproductive firms, who may have behaved in this manner 
in order to soften the blow of the shock onto their profits, 
and thereby increase their chances of survival. 
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